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This study tests the hypothesis that the ongoing restructuring pro-
cess in the European electricity sector, as well as market participants’
adaptation to the new legal framework, have caused electricity whole-
sale day-ahead prices to converge towards arbitrage freeness. Using
hourly cross-border capacity auction results at the Dutch-German and
at the Danish-German border for the years 2002 to 2004, and the
respective spot prices, we estimate a time-varying coeﬃcient model
based on the law of one price (LOP). The results of these estimations
are used to calculate the speed of convergence towards the LOP. While
the German - Dutch prices and the German - West Danish prices are
clearly developing towards arbitrage freeness, the German and East
Danish prices do not exhibit signiﬁcant convergence.
Keywords: Electricity Prices, European Integration, Time Series
Analysis
JEL classiﬁcation: L94, C5, G1
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Electricity markets throughout Europe have undergone signiﬁcant changes
in recent years. These developments have mainly been due to European
economic policies that target the creation of a single sustainable European
market for goods and services and thus for electricity, as well. The focus
of these policies is on stimulating competition and reaping gains from inter-
national cooperation through such means as reserve sharing and combining
diﬀerent national consumption and production patterns. A common elec-
tricity market is expected to increase welfare by ensuring security of supply
and improving allocation through more cost-reﬂective prices. Two important
directives, one regulation and a variety of decisions have been issued by the
European Union obliging all old and new EU member states to make sub-
stantial reform eﬀorts to prepare the path for the development of a single
European electricity market. These various measures require that markets
be opened (e.g. Directive 2003/54/EC), obstacles to cross-border trade be
reduced (Regulation 1228/2003), and non-discriminatory third-party access
be guaranteed (e.g. Directive 2003/54/EC). The implementation of these
obligations into national law has diﬀered signiﬁcantly among countries, and
therefore a variety of reports benchmarking national electricity sector reforms
have been issued (e.g. EC (2005), OXERA (2004), EBRD (2004)). They re-
veal that although substantial progress has been made in recent years some,
national markets still face major obstacles to market entry and electricity
trade.
Given structural changes that have taken place in the national electricity
sectors in recent years, this paper asks whether market outcomes indicate an
improved competitive situation in Europe. A strong indicator for the success
of market reforms is the interaction of price signals across countries. Similar
electricity prices throughout Europe2 would be evidence of a single European
electricity market. The studies of Bower (2002), Boisseleau (2004) as well as
Armstrong and Galli (2005) compare electricity day-ahead wholesale prices
at various power exchanges in Europe. Bower (2002) applies correlation and
cointegration analysis to prices from the Nordic Countries, Germany, Spain,
England and Wales as well as the Netherlands in 2001.3 He concludes that
2When corrected for transmission costs and congestion fees.
3Boisseleau points out that the cointegration approach used in Bower’s analysis is
inappropriate because the original price series contained no unit root. In addition, Bower’s
use of unweighted daily average data is a ﬂaw, given the strong diﬀerences between peak
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some integration of European markets was already in evidence in 2001, es-
pecially between the Netherlands and its neighbors and within the NordPool
area. The relevant chapter in Boisseleau (2004) focuses on regression and
correlation analysis. He ﬁnds that the level of integration of European mar-
kets is very low, and that, except for the NordPool, European prices contain
no unit root. Both, Bower (2002) and Boisseleau (2004) describe the respec-
tive status quo of electricity market integration. By way of contrast, Arm-
strong and Galli (2005) analyze the European price developments over time.
They study the evolution of price diﬀerentials between France, Germany, the
Netherlands and Spain in the years 2002 to 2004 and conclude that Euro-
pean electricity markets converged during this period. Although this study
is a step forward, since it was the ﬁrst to analyze the process of price con-
vergence in Europe it contains several ﬂaws. First, the reasoning is based
on the comparison of only three yearly averages of price diﬀerentials. Given
the large number of data points (the three years amount to 26,304 hours)
this approach is relatively undiﬀerentiated. Second, no statistical tests were
performed on the signiﬁcance of the dissimilarity of the yearly average price
diﬀerentials. And third, the study excludes available relevant information -
such as the results of the explicit cross-border capacity auctions between the
Netherlands and Germany.
In this paper, we propose a diﬀerent approach. We investigate the suc-
cess of European electricity sector reforms by analyzing the development of
wholesale prices over time. The hypothesis that prices converge is derived
from both the potential instantaneous eﬀects of the various reform steps on
prices and the assumed indirect reaction due to market players adapting to
the new framework. The hypothesis of price convergence will be tested by
applying a time-varying coeﬃcient model to day-ahead electricity prices in
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. This approach was chosen in order
to monitor a continuous evolution over time. The countries considered were
selected with respect to the availability of transmission capacity auction re-
sults, which allow us to incorporate cross-border transmission costs into the
analysis.
In the next section, the electricity wholesale day-ahead price series for
eight price zones in Europe are introduced, and their interaction is studied by
means of static principal component analysis. Then the cross-border trans-
mission auction results are presented and relevant arbitrage opportunities in
and oﬀ-peak price behavior on the electricity market.
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2 Data
international electricity trade are discussed. The third section describes a
time-varying coeﬃcient model and applies it in order to test whether prices
at the Dutch-German and the Danish-German border converged during the
years 2002 to 2004. Section four draws policy conclusions from the analysis.
2 Data
2.1 Wholesale spot prices
Workable wholesale markets are a cornerstone of the European way to build-
ing a common electricity market. Thus, most of the old and some of the
new member states have established power exchanges in recent years. Usu-
ally ”day-ahead” (spot) and ”future” contracts are traded on these markets.
The varying maturities of future contracts make it diﬃcult to compare price
developments among markets. By way of contrast, the number of products
on spot markets is far lower. Usually only electricity for single hours of the
following day as well as for diﬀerent bands, like peak and oﬀ-peak periods,
are traded. Since the deﬁnition of load periods varies across markets, and
because single hour prices give a much more detailed impression of intraday
developments the latter are used in this analysis. A further advantage of
hourly spot prices is the reﬂection of the current market situation whereas
many of the uncertainties found on future markets are absent.
This study uses data on three West European countries (France, Ger-
many, Netherlands), two Central European new EU member states (Poland,
Czech Republic) and three North European price areas (East Denmark, West
Denmark, Sweden). Spot market volumes and abbreviations used for these
markets are summarized in Table 1. Note that since the participation in the
considered wholesale spot markets is voluntary, their liquidity only represents
a relatively small fraction of domestic consumption. Especially the French,
Polish and Czech day-ahead prices stand for only a minor market segment.
Despite all diﬀerences in structure, liquidity, products and market mech-
anisms, the power exchanges in France (Powernext), Germany (EEX), the
Netherlands (APX) and Poland (PolPX) all exhibit similarly function ”day-
ahead” segments of their respective national markets. The Nordic countries
(Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) have a common power exchange
called NordPool, which organizes the joint spot market Elspot. In order to
incorporate congestion into the price formation mechanism, the Nordic re-
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Table 1: Spot market volumes and abbreviations






APX - Amsterdam Power Exchange 13,402 110,047
EEX - European Energy Exchange, Leipzig 59,414 513,015
DKE - East Danish NordPool price area 14,251
DKW - West Danish NordPool price area 21,244
SWE - Swedish NordPool price area 145,476
PNX - Powernext, Paris 14,179 475,966
PPX - Polish Power Exchange, Warsaw 1,590 130,275
OTE - Czech Market Operator 289 61,449
gion is split into diﬀerent price areas, for which spot prices and congestion
fees are calculated simultaneously. Finally, the Czech market operator OTE
also organizes a day-ahead market. Although OTE is not a typical power
exchange, it provides the only available data on hourly spot prices from this
major electricity-exporting country.
Figure 1 reveals one of the peculiarities of electricity prices - their strong
seasonalities. In Amsterdam, for example, average power prices at the 12th
hour (11am-12am) were around three times higher than average prices of
the 4th hour (3am-4am) in 2004. These large diﬀerences over the course of
the day are due to the non-storability of electricity. In addition to the daily
patterns, weekly and yearly seasonalities also exist. Unless these price ﬂuc-
tuations are less severe in some of the power markets considered5, they have
to be coped with. Because daily, weekly and yearly seasonalities interact,
national holidays diﬀer across countries and seasonality eﬀects themselves
change over time it is very diﬃcult to deseasonalize the data. Therefore we
circumvent the seasonality problem by dividing all series into 24-sub series
each of which represents one hour of the day. The weekly seasonalities have
4Source: Nordel and UCTE.
5The relatively modest daily seasonalities in Poland and Sweden have very diﬀerent
causes. The low price volatility in Poland can be linked to the low liquidity of the Polish
market which signals ineﬃcient pricing and the high number of combined heat and power
plants that run no matter what the prices are. On the other side, the relatively ﬂat
Swedish and East-Danish price proﬁles are explained by the high share of hydropower in
the region (Norway).
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Figure 1: Yearly average wholesale electricity spot prices for each hour of
the day



































































been removed mainly by excluding all Saturdays and Sundays from the sam-
ple.6 Thus we obtain 192 series (8 x 24) consisting of 784 weekdays each.
Finally the missing values in each series are replaced by the last observed
value. The conversion into euros is done using the daily exchange rates pro-
vided by www.oanda.com.
To assess the quality of the obtained data sets, two pretests have been
performed. First we check the unit root hypothesis as the absence of a unit
root is both a typical statistical feature of electricity prices and a prerequi-
site for many statistical methods.7 The results of the ADF tests suggest that
6By modeling the Amsterdam, Leipzig and London spot prices with dummy variables
for Saturdays and Sundays Huisman and Mahieu (2003) found that these dummies were
signiﬁcant and prices were always lower on Sunday. Since we are more concerned with de-
creasing the degrees of freedom than with using all available data, we decided to completely
exclude weekends from the sample.
7Lucia and Schwartz (2001) as well as Worthington et al. (2005) concluded that the
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Figure 2: Yearly average wholesale electricity spot prices for each hour of
the day
the week-days electricity prices for the eight wholesale markets considered do
not experience unit root behavior.8 This absence of a unit root in electricity
prices can be partly explained by the fact that in contrast to most other
commodities, power is not economically storable and thus cannot easily be
allocated between diﬀerent periods. Therefore today’s electricity prices are
basically not the best guess for tomorrow’s prices, which is what the unit
root hypothesis suggests.
Second, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is performed to reveal
electricity spot prices they analyzed were stationary. Note however, that De Vany and
Walls (1999) found a unit root in electricity spot prices of the Western US.
8Only for one hourly series of the Swedish prices the unit root hypothesis could not
be rejected at the 99% signiﬁcance level. At the 95% level the unit root hypothesis was
rejected for all series considered. The detailed results are given in the appendix (Table 4).
We used 5 lags and incorporated a constant in the estimation.
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the interaction between the price series.9 The underlying idea of PCA is to
calculate the linear combinations of the original data matrix explaining most
of the variance. Our data matrix consists of the week-day price series for the
eight wholesale markets at a certain hour of the day. We calculate the ﬁrst
and second principal component (PC) for the normalized data, and compute
the correlation between the PCs and the original data.10 The results are
summarized in the form of a scatter plot. As Figure 2 indicates, the eight
wholesale markets can be roughly divided into three regional groups. The
ﬁrst group consists of the Dutch, German and French market. The second
group contains the two Nordel transmission sub-zones East Denmark and
Sweden. The third is made up of the two new EU member states, Poland
and the Czech Republic. The only market that cannot be clearly attributed
to either of these groups is the West Danish price area of the NordPool. At
the same time, Figure 2 indicates that the West Danish price is located at the
halfway point of a line connecting the Nordic and the West European mar-
kets, which algebraically represents its real function as link between those two
regional markets. Together with the aforementioned clustering of strongly
interconnected markets, this is evidence that at least some arbitrage between
neighboring countries is taking place and thus that the data are likely to be
appropriate for the following in-depth analysis.11
Although principal component analysis is able to provide evidence of dis-
9For the technical details of PCA see for example Jackson (1991).
10Detailed results can be found in the Appendix (Table 5).
11Note however, that some of the common regional developments can be explained by
shared supply and demand conditions (especially weather) and that thus not all correla-
tion is due only to arbitrage between countries. To assess the importance of this eﬀect
we analyzed the interactions of hourly spot volumes and prices. The hypothesis that the
correlation of weather-driven demand and supply shocks in diﬀerent regions is partly re-
sponsible for their correlated market outcomes implies that, assuming those uncertainties
could not be included in the forward markets, traded volumes in the spot markets are cor-
related. When using an OLS-regression of detrended ﬁrst diﬀerences of the weekdays spot
volumes of the Nordic, Dutch and German markets, no signiﬁcant relationship between
their spot market volumes could be found (see Figure 8 in the Appendix). Furthermore,
the same methodology was unable to show a clear link between the spot volumes and the
spot prices in the Dutch, French and German markets (see Figure 9 in the Appendix).
Only for the Nordic market was a signiﬁcant relationship between spot prices and spot vol-
umes to be found. Because no evidence was to be found for the hypothetical transmission
process that links an unexpected regional weather event to higher spot market volumes in
the region, ultimately leading to higher prices, the magnitude of this eﬀect seems to be
limited.
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tinct regional price developments and thus of the existence of international
arbitrage possibilities, it does not allow us to examine whether markets con-
verge or diverge over time. Furthermore, a complete description of inter-
national electricity wholesale markets is only possible when incorporating
the allocation mechanisms of cross-border transmission capacities into the
analysis.
2.2 Cross border transmission auction results
In order to trade electricity between countries it must be transmittable. This
is made possible by cross-border transmission lines. Due to the limited ca-
pacity of these lines, the right to use them in case of excess demand has
to be allocated to the interested parties. These so-called congestion man-
agement methods vary signiﬁcantly throughout Europe (for more details
see ETSO (2004)). Applied methods range from ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-serve ap-
proaches used by Belgium and France, to explicit auctions as used between
Germany and the Netherlands and the implicit auctions used in the NordPool
area. The advantages and disadvantages of these methods are discussed in
ETSO (2004) and CONSENTEC (2004). Apart from allocation distortions,
the non-auction-based congestion management methods also fail to provide
data on the utilization of interconnection lines and the actual willingness to
pay for the limited capacities.12 On the other hand, the implicit auctions
of the NordPool area fulﬁll the arbitrage freeness condition by construction.
Therefore, only daily auction results for the Dutch-German and the Danish-
German border are available for our analysis.
On the Danish-German border there are three adjacent transmission
zones, one on the German (EON) and two on the Danish side (Eltra and
Elkraft). Since the West Danish transmission network operated by Eltra is
part of the West European UCTE-transmission system, and since the East
Danish network (Elkraft) operates within the Nordel system, interconnection
capacities between them are relatively low and thus prices diﬀer signiﬁcantly
. Therefore, both Danish areas are incorporated into the analysis.
On the Dutch-German border, the auction is operated by TenneT, the
12It is worth noting that there are projects for the replacement of non-auction based
methods by explicit auction between some of the countries considered. For example the
transmission system operators (TSO) in Poland (PSE), the Czech Republic (CEPS) and
Germany (Vattenfall ET) are planning a joint explicit daily auction of their interconnection
capacities.
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Figure 3: Cross-border transmission price diﬀerential (export price minus
import price) in Euro/MWh 2002-2004
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2 Data
Figure 4: EEX-DKW price diﬀerential and associated physical ﬂows between
West Denmark and Germany 2002-2004














































































Dutch transmission system operator (TSO). From the German side, two
TSOs (RWE and EON) maintain cross-border transmission lines with the
Dutch grid. Therefore, TenneT calculates the prices for both interconnec-
tions (EON-TenneT and RWE-TenneT) separately. Figure 3 indicates that
auction results at both interconnections are almost equal on average. Because
only one German spot price is available, the RWE-TenneT interconnection
is omitted in the analysis.
Figure 4 shows, using the example of the West Danish-German border,
that electricity relatively often ﬂows from high-price to low-price areas (gray
crosses), which is counterintuitive. These deviations can hardly be explained
by loop ﬂows, because West Denmark is a peninsula. If long-term contracts
were responsible for this unusual behavior, this would imply that domestic
arbitrage is imperfect. Another reason for the deviation from economic in-
tuition could be the uncertainty arising from the timing of the day-ahead
price-setting processes.
Table 2 illustrates the auction process. First, the transmission capacity
10DIW Berlin Discussion Paper 512
2 Data
Figure 5: Yearly average arbitrage opportunities






























Announcement of ATC 8:30 9:00
End of bidding 9:00 9:30 10:30 12:00 12:00
Publication of results 9:30 10:00 11:00 12:00 12:15
available in the daily auction is announced, then bids are submitted, the auc-
tion is closed and the results are published. While the transmission capacity
auction is taking place the power exchanges are collecting bids and selling
oﬀers. A certain time after the capacity auction results are published, power
exchanges close the bidding, calculate spot prices and publish them. There-
fore, a trader aiming to do arbitrage by selling cheaper German power to
the Netherlands has to ﬁrst bid on transmission capacity without knowledge
of the exact spot prices, then submit his sell oﬀer for electricity in Amster-
dam knowing only the transmission auction results. After receiving the APX
price, the transmission capacity price and the quantities purchased, he can
now bid for German power at the EEX.13
From the example described above, it is clear that explicit auctions do
not always result in (full informational) arbitrage freeness. However whether
or not there are fundamental distortions is another question. We calculate
13Note that this example ignores that the trader might be in the possession of long-term
contracts in one or more of the three markets.
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the diﬀerence between the yearly average of the daily transmission auction
prices and the yearly average of the spot price diﬀerentials for each hour of
the day. Figure 5 provides clear evidence of the existence of arbitrage oppor-
tunities14 between German and Dutch as well as German and Danish prices.
However, comparing the yearly averages also indicates that the ineﬃciencies
have decreased over time. This might be explained by improved legislative
and regulatory frameworks, learning processes being undergone by the mar-
ket participants, or both. Although Figure 5 is able to provide initial insights
and a comprehensive graphical representation of the development of cross-
border arbitrage possibilities, simply averaging over the year tends to neglect
a wealth of valuable information. Over the course of the year, periods where
exporting or importing provides arbitrage opportunities might balance each
other out, the eﬀect of events like a transmission line closure might disap-
pear and other intra-year patterns might remain undetected. Therefore, an
approach providing more diﬀerentiated results is applied in the next section.
3 Method and Results
The starting point for the analysis of the eﬃciency of markets is usually the
law of one price (LOP). The LOP states that two similar commodities, when
oﬀered at the same location, have the same price. In theory the LOP should
apply to wholesale electricity spot prices, too. However, there are several
factors that lead to deviations from price equalization. The hypothesis to
be tested in our analysis is that some of the reasons for these ineﬃciencies
were removed or alleviated as a result of the ongoing electricity sector re-
forms, and thus, prices converged in the period under consideration. The
analysis is carried out in three steps: First, a time-variant coeﬃcient (®t)
representing the diﬀerence between domestic and import prices is estimated.
Second, a proximity index is calculated, indicating the closeness of the ob-
served prices to the LOP. And third, the speed of convergence towards the
LOP is calculated by estimating the slope of the proximity trend index.
When comparing the prices of goods at diﬀerent locations, the costs asso-
ciated with transport have to be included in the analysis. Therefore arbitrage
freeness is given if the price in the exporting country plus the transmission
cost is equal to the price in the importing country. This relationship is
14Here arbitrage opportunities are:
j domestic pricet¡ foreign pricet¡ import costt+ export costtj > 0:
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formalized in (1) for the example of German and Dutch prices. Here the
variable transmEEX¡>APX;t is the congestion fee for one MWh ﬂowing from
Germany to the Netherlands. In the full information case considered, either
transmEEX¡>APX;t or transmAPX¡>EEX;t is zero.15
pEEX;t + transmEEX¡>APX;t = pAPX;t + transmAPX¡>EEX;t (1)
In reality, there are several factors that may lead to deviations from the LOP,
e.g. uncertainty, line failures, market power and regulation. To be able to
analyze whether prices converged towards the LOP in the long run, the devi-
ations from the LOP have to be separated into a short-term idiosyncratic and
a long-term systematic component. For this purpose time-varying coeﬃcient
models provide an adequate framework.16
yt = ®t ¢ xt + ²t
®t = ®t¡1 + Àt (2)
with:
yt = pi;t
xt = pj;t + transmi¡>j;t ¡ transmj¡>i;t
i;j = APX, EEX, DKE, DKW
were ²t » N(0;¾2
²) and Àt » N(0;¾2
À) are white noise processes and ®t is the
vector of unobservable coeﬃcients at time t. The idea behind (2) is that the
coeﬃcient ®t be allowed to change smoothly over time. Thus (2) is well suited
to model long-run convergence processes. As described in Hamilton (1992
p.399 ﬀ)17 time-varying coeﬃcient models such as (2) are estimated using
the Kalman Filter. Although multiple setups for this ﬁlter have evolved over
time, the general idea of this algorithm to subsequently predict the next pe-
riod’s observation, compare this forecast with the realization and include the
15In the real world, cross-border transmission capacity auctions often end up having
positive prices in both directions, which is a clear sign of market ineﬃciencies (e.g. incor-
rect spot price forecasts, inner-market frictions caused by market design or market power).
Such departures from our trade model are no ﬂaw for us, since we aim at benchmarking
the real world versus our perfect market model.
16To circumvent the colinearity problem associated with the fact that the price of the
exporting country is negatively correlated with the transmission costs, a new independent
variable is deﬁned as the price in the exporting country plus the exporting and minus the
importing costs.
17Also see Hamilton (1992) for technical details on the algorithm and its properties.
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diﬀerence in the prediction for the next period was maintained in all imple-
mentations. For our purposes we found the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF)
algorithm, as implemented in the ReBEL c ° Toolkit18 to be an appropriate
compromise among speed, accuracy and practicability. To estimate (2), as-
sumptions on the initial variances for ² , À and ®0 as well as on the expected
value of ®0 have to be made. Setting E(®0) =
yt
xt is straightforward whereas
deciding on the variances is less intuitive. Generally the initial variances can
be interpreted as the starting point of the search for the global extrema of
the likelihood function. Therefore, if the function has several local maxima, a
”wrong” starting point can lead to undesirable results.19 Although in general
this decision can be of great importance, numerous sensitivity tests suggest
that our results are robust with respect to the initial variances.20
Another issue one has to address when estimating (2) is which time se-
ries to use. To be able to distinguish peak from oﬀ-peak developments, we
estimate (2) for each hour of the week-days series. By doing so, peak time
(9-21h) and oﬀ-peak time (22-8h) can be clearly distinguished. Finally, the
®t are estimated for each hour of the day separately using the speciﬁcations
of the EKF described above. Due to the lack of hourly transmission prices
for most of the borders, (2) can only be estimated for the German - Dutch
(EEX-APX), the German - West Danish (EEX-DKW) and the German -
East Danish (EEX-DKE) border.
The results depicted in Figure 6 clearly show periods of price equalization
and periods of price divergence. Some of the latter can be explained by
transmission line failures, for example the closure of the Kontek direct current
cable between East Denmark and Germany that caused enormous deviations
from the LOP in early 2003.21 Other periods of deviations are the result of
18ReBEL: Recursive Bayesian Estimation Library - A Matlab toolkit for Recursive
Bayesian Estimation. Copyright 2002, Rudolph van der Merwe at the OGI School of
Science & Engineering at OHSU (Oregon Health & Science University).
19This is why the initial variances should be selected with care. The tradeoﬀ can be
described as follows: Using too-high values for ¾2
®0 and ¾2
À would lead to the inclusion of
short-term behavior in ®t which would make it diﬃcult to distinguish idiosyncratic shocks
from systematic patterns. On the other hand, setting a low variance for Àt would lead to
ignoring signiﬁcant developments in the convergence process.
20Finally we adjusted the initial variance of ²t to 1 and Àt to 0.0001 times the variance
of yt ¡ xt. Note that adjusting these values up or down by factor 100 does not change
results as long as ¾2
² remains 10,000 times bigger than ¾2
À.
21From 4th to 28th of January 2003, the Kontek line was closed due to a cable malfunc-
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Figure 6: Time-variant coeﬃcient (®t) for the German (EEX) - Dutch
(APX) and German (EEX) - Danish (DKE, DKW) borders for
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national price spikes that did not lead to higher cross-border transmission
capacity prices. Whether uncertainty or other factors are responsible for
these repeated market failures remains unclear. The overall picture does,
however, show slight convergence.
To get a more precise idea of the convergence process, we also construct
an indicator for the proximity of markets using the ﬁltered coeﬃcients. This
is done by inverting all ®t that are greater than one:
°t =
(
ˆ ®t if ˆ ®t < 1;
1=ˆ ®t if ˆ ®t ¸ 1:
(3)
The proximity indices (°t) are depicted in Figure 7 together with their trend
line. The slope of the trend line (µ) is a one-number summary of the conver-
gence or divergence of each pair of the two markets.22 A signiﬁcantly positive
µ points to convergence of the price series towards the LOP by indicating that
formerly existing arbitrage opportunities diminished over time. Testing the
signiﬁcance of µ is not straightforward since the usual Student-distribution
does not apply because °t is not normally distributed.
Therefore, the critical values for the test statistic were calculated via
simulation. For this purpose, we ﬁrst created n artiﬁcial vectors of ˜ °t;i for
every hour and every combination of countries by estimating (2) and (3)
for synthetic observation and state series.23 Then, for each vector of ˜ °t;i
we calculated the t-value for the null-hypothesis that µ equals zero. By
comparing the t-value of the µ for the real data with the t-value of the ˜ µi for
tion on the German side. Despite bad weather, Vattenfall immediately started to repair
the cable because of high prices following water shortages in the Nordel area. [Source:
http://www.udo-leuschner.de/energie-chronik/030212.htm]
22The results are summarized for all hours of the day in Table 6 in the appendix.
23To generate the artiﬁcial values of ®t and yt we apply the residuals bootstrapping
methodology (see Chernick (1999 pp. 76-78)). This is done separately for every hour and
every combination of countries because the distribution of the test statistics depends on
the statistical features of each single series. In all cases the independent series ˜ xt;i are given
by the original data xt. The initial state variable ˜ ®0;i is drawn with replacement from
the estimated ˆ ®t. The error terms ˜ Àt;i for the state equation are drawn with replacement
from ˆ ®t ¡ ˆ ®t¡1. Thus n artiﬁcial state variables are calculated by ˜ ®t+1;i = ˜ ®t;i + ˜ Àt;i for
n random draws of ˜ ®0;i and (n £ t) random draws of ˜ Àt;i. To create synthetic values of
the dependent variable yt we follow the same methodology drawing with replacement ˜ ²t;i
from the residuals of yt ¡ xt and using them together with ˜ xt;i and the artiﬁcial values of
˜ ®t;i to calculate ˜ yt;i = ˜ ®t;i˜ xt;i + ˜ ²t;i.
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Table 3: Number of signiﬁcantly converging hourly series between 2002 and
2004 at the 10% signiﬁcance level
APX-EEX DKE-EEX DKW-EEX
Convergence towards the LOP 12 0 19
the artiﬁcially generated series one can now determine the level of signiﬁcance
of the slope.
As Table 3 shows, for more than half of the hours of the day, the Ams-
terdam (APX) and Leipzig (EEX) prices as well as the West Danish (DKW)
and German (EEX) prices converged towards arbitrage freeness in the sample
period. This strongly supports our hypothesis that changes in the framework
conditions as well as market participants’ adaptation to these changes had the
eﬀect of moving prices towards their allocation-optimal value. The highest
rates of convergence are to be found at the West Danish - German border.
Since spot price diﬀerentials between EEX and DKW did not fall signiﬁ-
cantly, the eﬀect can be attributed to improved behavior of the transmission
capacity market participants as well as some optimizations of the auction
procedure that were implemented in the period under observation.24 The
relatively high speed of convergence at the West Danish - German border
is particularly surprising because the initial level of arbitrage was already
been relatively advanced.25 Thus transmission capacity prices between West
Denmark and Germany are now close to being eﬃcient.
Convergence towards the LOP is less apparent for the German - Dutch
interconnection since in the sample period, only 12 hourly series at this bor-
der converged. The absence of signiﬁcant progress towards eﬃcient pricing
between the 9th and the 19st hour can be explained by the enormous price
spikes occurring in the years 2002 to 2004 on the Amsterdam market dur-
ing peak-periods. These extreme price ﬂuctuations led to high uncertainty
for market participants, who consequently found it more diﬃcult to predict
24Beginning of April, 2002, FTP via ISDN became the main way of providing the sched-
ules and the bids instead of e-mail. E-mail is used as secondary alternative. Beginning
on June 2003 a pro-rata allocation of the rest capacity (several requests with the same
price bid exceed the available capacity) was introduced and the timetable was tightened.
[Source: Rules for the Daily Auction of Transmission Capacity at the Danish - German
Transmission Border]
25As indicated in Table 7, the average intercept for DKW-EEX was 0.83, whereas the
average intercepts for DKE-EEX was 0.80.
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Figure 7: Proximity indices (°) and convergence indicators (µ ) for the Ger-
man - Dutch, the German - West Danish and the German - East
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the forthcoming arbitrage possibilities and were thus incapable of bidding
correctly at the capacity auctions. By way of contrast, all prices between
the 20th and the 8th hour converged towards the LOP and congestion prices
came close to reaching eﬃcient levels.
In contrast to the West Danish - German and the Dutch - German border,
the East Danish - German prices do not exhibit signiﬁcant signs of conver-
gence. For their behavior, we ﬁnd three main explanations to be plausible:
First, the East Danish - German interconnection links two asynchronously
operating transmission systems, namely the UCTE and Nordel, which are
characterized by moderately diﬀering production structures and thus price
patterns. Second, there exists only one cable (the Kontek undersea line) be-
tween the two countries which has been subject to various planned and un-
planned closures in the sample period.26 And third, auction design and mar-
ket power might be partly responsible for the fact that the cross-border ca-
pacity auctions so often did not determine the economically eﬃcient scarcity
rents.
After having seen that at the three borders, prices moved at diﬀerent
paces towards arbitrage freeness one now can ask how this process took place.
Figure 7 gives the visual impression that convergence advanced steadily but
was constantly interrupted by temporary setbacks. This leads us to conclude
that the main driving force for convergence was not the implementation of
new rules but the gradual adaptation of market players who continuously
learned how to use (and thus reduce) the remaining arbitrage possibilities.
4 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Using a time-varying coeﬃcient model, we show that in recent years, the un-
used arbitrage opportunities in electricity trade between West Denmark and
Germany as well as between the Netherlands and Germany have diminished
signiﬁcantly. This is an indication that sector reforms, the implementation
of market-based congestion management methods and the adaptation of the
market participants to the new framework have succeeded in decreasing mar-
ket ineﬃciencies. We ﬁnd evidence that the market participants’ adaptation
has been the main driving force behind the gradual convergence process.
26Another explanation, the diﬃculty of reversing the power ﬂows in a single-line system,
is not satisfactory, since usually in HVDC (high voltage direct current) lines (like the
Kontek or the Baltic cable) the direction can be switched within a few seconds.
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Despite this good news, our analysis provides evidence that the extreme
price spikes on the Dutch market during peak-periods caused considerable
uncertainties for market participants, who were thus unable to achieve near-
zero arbitrage. Moreover it has been shown that the East Danish - German
cross-border capacity auctions did not improve their ability to determine the
economically eﬃcient scarcity rents in the years 2002 to 2004.
Thus the examples analyzed demonstrate that although some progress in
the eﬃciency of cross-border electricity trade has been made, a single Euro-
pean market for electricity is still far oﬀ. Therefore an increasing liquidity of
spot and transmission capacity markets, a rising number of wholesale mar-
ket participants and improving methods of market based congestion manage-
ment are needed to further promote the convergence process. Furthermore,
the reduction of physical bottlenecks remains an important prerequisite for
European electricity market integration.
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Table 4: ADF-test results for the wholesale spot prices of each hour of the
day27
APX DKE DKW EEX OTE PNX PPX SWE
1h -17.64 -4.98 -17.26 -15.71 -17.76 -15.53 -17.84 -4.67
2h -15.90 -6.13 -17.09 -16.17 -17.10 -15.48 -16.22 -4.94
3h -15.51 -6.72 -18.07 -15.45 -16.88 -14.57 -13.02 -5.46
4h -15.07 -6.43 -18.09 -15.64 -17.65 -14.36 -13.22 -5.42
5h -15.53 -6.31 -17.92 -15.78 -15.34 -15.09 -14.24 -4.78
6h -14.54 -4.88 -14.01 -15.10 -17.57 -16.45 -14.34 -4.08
7h -13.85 -5.11 -15.35 -15.96 -17.54 -14.72 -14.99 -3.79
8h -18.60 -12.02 -14.37 -23.58 -17.10 -16.45 -10.76 -4.98
9h -22.86 -7.45 -25.26 -23.14 -17.82 -15.41 -12.08 -5.69
10h -26.09 -7.43 -23.50 -19.93 -18.76 -26.53 -11.86 -5.47
11h -20.79 -14.39 -24.48 -23.79 -19.32 -24.84 -11.82 -5.57
12h -19.55 -15.95 -23.57 -17.91 -19.96 -22.07 -11.29 -8.61
13h -22.18 -8.00 -22.74 -20.25 -19.19 -23.90 -11.00 -5.11
14h -21.64 -8.62 -26.74 -20.04 -19.26 -25.84 -11.87 -4.65
15h -19.51 -8.90 -25.41 -17.63 -19.71 -26.52 -13.18 -3.96
16h -18.33 -6.97 -13.41 -16.76 -17.92 -28.04 -14.26 -3.80
17h -8.85 -5.93 -11.86 -15.00 -18.52 -13.54 -14.46 -3.64
18h -10.82 -11.08 -13.62 -19.23 -16.65 -13.16 -13.95 -6.35
19h -16.13 -14.13 -17.00 -29.76 -16.75 -15.88 -12.21 -5.04
20h -17.84 -6.64 -11.82 -13.42 -16.59 -15.04 -10.92 -3.89
21h -20.39 -5.58 -10.90 -14.28 -17.81 -12.64 -10.79 -4.14
22h -18.81 -4.70 -13.66 -13.30 -18.97 -11.58 -11.38 -3.63
23h -14.73 -4.13 -15.15 -13.29 -19.43 -13.24 -7.99 -3.24
24h -21.85 -4.43 -19.34 -11.73 -18.27 -13.02 -13.90 -3.60
27The 99% critical value for all hours is -3.46
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Figure 8: Correlation of detrended ﬁrst diﬀerences of spot volumes and
prices 2002-2004

























Figure 9: Correlation of detrended ﬁrst diﬀerences of spot volumes 2002-
2004
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APX DKE DKW EEX OTE PNX PPX SWE
1 0.39 0.63 0.45 0.31 0.40 0.46 0.18 0.44 0.09 0.31
2 0.38 0.63 0.48 0.25 0.37 0.48 0.22 0.47 0.09 0.24
3 0.37 0.62 0.48 0.27 0.37 0.48 0.19 0.47 0.09 0.26
4 0.38 0.62 0.47 0.28 0.37 0.47 0.23 0.46 0.08 0.27
5 0.39 0.63 0.45 0.30 0.37 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.15 0.29
6 0.44 0.68 0.44 0.28 0.39 0.44 0.26 0.43 0.23 0.27
7 0.47 0.72 0.45 0.25 0.39 0.45 0.29 0.42 0.26 0.24
8 0.53 0.73 0.40 0.32 0.40 0.39 0.34 0.37 0.28 0.31
9 0.42 0.62 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.42 0.31 0.40 0.30 0.37
10 0.38 0.57 0.30 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.42
11 0.36 0.55 0.36 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.27 0.34 0.28 0.39
12 0.39 0.58 0.37 0.36 0.43 0.39 0.31 0.36 0.28 0.31
13 0.40 0.61 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.37 0.24 0.32
14 0.36 0.56 0.37 0.40 0.35 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.21 0.37
15 0.36 0.57 0.37 0.40 0.36 0.38 0.35 0.36 0.18 0.38
16 0.38 0.60 0.26 0.44 0.48 0.36 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.43
17 0.44 0.66 0.22 0.41 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.37 0.22 0.40
18 0.48 0.66 0.28 0.41 0.42 0.39 0.30 0.37 0.20 0.40
19 0.44 0.60 0.34 0.42 0.43 0.28 0.25 0.41 0.18 0.42
20 0.49 0.68 0.30 0.41 0.43 0.38 0.27 0.38 0.18 0.40
21 0.41 0.64 0.32 0.43 0.46 0.39 0.25 0.32 0.05 0.42
22 0.38 0.63 0.35 0.45 0.47 0.37 0.05 0.32 -0.14 0.45
23 0.38 0.62 0.33 0.44 0.47 0.41 0.01 0.30 -0.15 0.44
24 0.36 0.61 0.36 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.41 -0.06 0.37
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Growth Prob Growth Prob Growth Prob
1h 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.21 0.10 0.09
2h 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.21 0.14 0.07
3h 0.17 0.02 0.08 0.29 0.16 0.08
4h 0.17 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.16 0.10
5h 0.18 0.03 0.00 0.36 0.13 0.13
6h 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.14
7h 0.19 0.01 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.07
8h 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.06
9h 0.20 0.10 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.09
10h -0.51 0.30 0.02 0.20 0.17 0.08
11h -1.24 0.31 0.02 0.19 0.21 0.08
12h -2.07 0.56 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.08
13h 0.21 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.19 0.08
14h 0.43 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.07
15h 0.18 0.26 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.11
16h -2.94 0.59 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.08
17h -6.48 0.25 0.04 0.20 0.13 0.06
18h -29.29 0.16 -0.00 0.18 0.18 0.03
19h -5.88 0.74 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.08
20h 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.23 0.06 0.16
21h 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.09
22h 0.11 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.07
23h 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.06
24h - - 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.06
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1h 0.90 0.81 0.86
2h 0.89 0.76 0.80
3h 0.85 0.73 0.76
4h 0.84 0.71 0.73
5h 0.83 0.74 0.76
6h 0.82 0.79 0.83
7h 0.81 0.83 0.85
8h 0.82 0.79 0.85
9h 0.74 0.83 0.84
10h -0.43 0.82 0.81
11h -0.90 0.80 0.78
12h -2.60 0.67 0.78
13h 0.51 0.77 0.80
14h 0.26 0.80 0.78
15h 0.30 0.82 0.84
16h -3.83 0.83 0.88
17h -7.12 0.85 0.87
18h -33.98 0.86 0.83
19h -0.19 0.84 0.84
20h 0.84 0.85 0.90
21h 0.85 0.83 0.89
22h 0.88 0.84 0.85
23h 0.88 0.84 0.86
24h - 0.82 0.84
27